People often have to make decisions under uncertainty-that is, in situations where the probabilities of obtaining a payoff are unknown or at least difficult to ascertain. One solution to this problem is to infer the probability from the magnitude of the potential payoff and thus exploit the inverse relationship between payoffs and probabilities that occurs in many domains in the environment. Here, we investigated how the mind may implement such a solution: (1) Do people learn about risk-reward relationships from the environment-and if so, how? (2) How do learned risk-reward relationships impact preferences in decision-making under uncertainty? Across three experiments (N = 352), we found that participants can learn risk-reward relationships from being exposed to choice environments with a negative, positive, or uncorrelated risk-reward relationship. They were able to learn the associations both from gambles with explicitly stated payoffs and probabilities (Experiments 1 & 2) and from gambles about epistemic events (Experiment 3). In subsequent decisions under uncertainty, participants often exploited the learned association by inferring probabilities from the magnitudes of the payoffs. This inference systematically influenced their preferences under uncertainty: Participants who had been exposed to a negative risk-reward relationship tended to prefer the uncertain option over a smaller sure option for low payoffs, but not for high payoffs. This pattern reversed in the positive condition and disappeared in the uncorrelated condition. This adaptive change in preferences is consistent with the use of the risk-reward heuristic.
Introduction
In March 2016, James Stocklas won $291 million in the Florida Powerball lottery. Most people know that winning such a huge jackpot is a pretty unlikely event. Now consider his brother, Bob Stocklas. Bob bought a ticket for the same lottery at the same time as James and won just $7 (Newsome, 2016). Most people know that winning this kind of sum is far more likely than winning the jackpot. And, of course, most people are also painfully aware that not winning anything at all is much more likely than either of these events. While this story illustrates the strange vicissitudes of fortune, for our purposes it also illustrates just how comfortable people are with estimating the probability of winning from payoff magnitudes alone. How do people "know" how to estimate the chances of winning the lottery? Why do they associate the highest payoff with the lowest probability? Here, we argue that the key to understanding how the mind generates such estimates lies not within the mind alone, but how the mind is adapted to its environmental context (Anderson, 1991; Gibson, 1979; Gigerenzer, Hertwig, & Pachur, 2011; Marr, 1982; Perkovic & Orquin, 2017; Shepard, 1987; Simon, 1956; Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006) .
Beyond the lottery, risks and rewards, or payoffs and probabilities, are linked in many choice environments. Across choice environments, probably the most frequent and recurrent link between them is an inverse relationship: The higher rewards that we desire are unlikely to be obtained (Pleskac & Hertwig, 2014) . However, the strength of the relationship also varies across different domains. Monetary gambles in casinos, for instance, show a near perfect (though biased) inverse relationship between payoffs and probabilities. In other domains, such as where to submit a scientific manuscript (trading off impact factor against acceptance rate), the risk-reward relationship is less strong. Moreover, a risk-reward relationship is not always given. For instance, no relationship between risk and reward is to be expected in newly forming markets, that have not yet reached an equilibrium (Pleskac & Hertwig, 2014) . After identifying the ecological structures in which the mind usually operates, one can try to establish how the mind comes to terms with those ecological structures (Brunswik & Kamiya, 1953; Simon, 1956 ): Risk-reward structures can be exploited in decisions under uncertainty-where people have to choose between options whose payoffs are known but probabilities are not (Knight, 1921; Luce & Raiffa, 1957; Wakker, 2010) . Pleskac and Hertwig (2014) offered participants a gamble that gave them a chance to win x $ at the cost of $2, and asked
